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Abstract
Performing computations while maintaining privacy is an important problem in todays distributed
machine learning solutions. Consider the following two set ups between a client and a server, where
in setup i) the client has a public data vector x, the server has a large private database of data vectors
B and the client wants to find the inner products 〈x,yk〉,∀yk ∈ B. The client does not want the
server to learn x while the server does not want the client to learn the records in its database. This is
in contrast to another setup ii) where the client would like to perform an operation solely on its data,
such as computation of a matrix inverse on its data matrix M, but would like to use the superior
computing ability of the server to do so without having to leak M to the server.
We present a stochastic scheme for splitting the client data into privatized shares that are
transmitted to the server in such settings. The server performs the requested operations on these
shares instead of on the raw client data at the server. The obtained intermediate results are sent back
to the client where they are assembled by the client to obtain the final result.
1. Introduction
We describe a method for private computation in distributed machine learning via privatized shares
of sensitive data called splinters. This enables client devices to receive services from server without
directly sharing any sensitive data. The server performs computations over these splinters and the
corresponding results are sent back to the client. The client has required private coefficients to
perform specific operations referred to as unsplintering over these intermediate results in order to
obtain the required final result as if the sensitive data itself was sent across to the server instead of the
communicated splinters. The approach is relatively communication efficient, supports composition
of operations and does not require a trusted non-colluding third party to mediate the process.
Replication/download of the sensitive database is not required during this process. We show an
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application of this proposed method for privately performing operations such as inner product and
matrix inverse. Such a private computation with such fundamental operations results in a wide array
of societal applications such as private machine learning, private information retrieval, private set
intersection, private stream searching, private scientific computation and private information storage.
1.1 Contribution
The contributions in our paper can be enumerated as follows.
1. We propose a method called Splintering for private computation between two entities. The
method involves stochastically splitting the private data vector on the client into publicly
shareable privacy preserving shares called splinters and private coefficients. The server
performs specific computations on these splinters and returns the obtained intermediate results
to the client. The client further performs some computation on these intermediate results to
obtain the desired final result.
2. We share examples of our scheme for private computation of fundamental operations such
as that of a matrix inverse, inner product or for ascertaining set inclusion or to find k-nearest
neighbors given a private query vector on a client device.
3. We enhance the security of our method by pairing each splinter with many decoy splinters
that cannot be distinguished from the original splinter. We back this up with theory as well
as with experimental results using state of the art methods like XGBoost that fail to classify
the decoy splinters from the original splinter. We show that these classification models end up
performing only upto a chance accuracy, even after rigorous tuning. This protects the client
data from being reconstructed by a malicious server as we theoretically show that the number
of samples the server has access to is much below the sample complexity required to perform a
decent statistical recovery that leaks the raw data of the client. We also share theoretical results
that prevent reconstruction of servers data by a malicious client.
4. To learn decoy distributions that can generate the decoy splinters with security guarantees,
we connect distance correlation, a statistical measure of dependency whose sample statistic is
based on distances to Kullback-Leibler divergence between Multivariate Gaussians. Population
distance correlations is dependent on a distance between the joint characteristic functions
(Fourier transform of probability distribution) and marginal characteristic functions. We
show an elegant separability property that allows for efficient estimation of Gaussian mixture
distributions that optimize Kullback-Leibler divergence with respect to a target Gaussian
mixture. We use these learnt distributions to generate our decoy splinters with theoretical
guarantees that an estimation of their population parameters requires a high sample complexity,
thereby protecting the client data.
1.2 Organization of this paper
We re-introduce splintering as part of the related work section along with other related works. In
section 2, we propose examples of splintering to perform operations such as matrix inverse. In
section 3, we introduce a naive way to generate splinters along with hardness of recovery guarantees
for privacy. In section 4, we introduce a better way to generate splinters using Gaussian mixtures
and share hardness of recovery guarantees. In section 5, we introduce a notion of decoy splinters to
further secure this method along with directly useful theoretical results from an information theoretic
perspective in order to generate these decoy splinters. In section 6, we share some experimental
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results to empirically back the theory in our scheme from section 5. We conclude the paper with an
appendix followed by a bibliography.
1.3 Related work
We share relevent related work to our proposed method and categorize them accordingly as follows:
1. Splintering for private querying Our work is an extension of our earlier work on Splintering
in (Vepakomma* and Raskar*, 2019; Raskar et al., 2019). We share more details about
splintering in the next section, given its direct relevance to the context of this paper.
2. Private information retrieval
PIR schemes introduced by Chor et al. (1995) look at the problem of devising a communication
protocol involving just two parties, the database and the user, each having a secret input of data
records r1, r2 . . . rn and a query record q respectively such that the user can retrieve a record ri
from the database, while keeping i private from this database entity. The PIR schemes can be
broadly categorized into information theoretic PIR Chor et al. (1995) and computational PIR
(Chor and Gilboa, 1997; Kushilevitz and Ostrovsky, 1997b; Cachin et al., 1999). Information
theoretic PIR schemes require replication of data across multiple servers. Communication
complexity of information theoretic PIR with 2 servers is O( 3√n), for k-servers is O(n1/Ω(k))
and for n-servers is polylog(n).(Chor et al., 1995; Kushilevitz and Ostrovsky, 1997a; Vengroff
and Scott Vitter, 1995; Williams and Sion, 2008; Mittal et al., 2011; Melchor, 2008; Goldberg,
2007; Aguilar-Melchor and Gaborit, 2007; Song et al., 2000)
3. Private set intersection
This paradigm aims to privately find an intersection between two sets. The works in private
set intersection (PSI) can be classified based on techniques based on publick-coefficient
cryptography (Meadows, 1986; De Cristofaro and Tsudik, 2010), generic secure computation
Huang et al. (2012) based on arithmetic and boolean circuits and those based on oblivious
transfer (Dong et al., 2013; Pinkas et al., 2014; Freedman et al., 2004; Dachman-Soled et al.,
2009; Kerschbaum, 2012; Rindal and Rosulek, 2017; Kamara et al., 2014; Debnath and Dutta,
2015). The initial works based on oblivious transfer assume semi-honest (passive) adversaries.
These techniques in conjunction with permutation hashing schemes such as cuckoo hashing
Arbitman et al. (2010) help provide greater scalability in terms of computation Pinkas et al.
(2015); De Cristofaro and Tsudik (2010); Kiss et al. (2017).
4. Differentially private SQL queries
These techniques for differential private answering of SQL queries allows for SQL predicates
and clauses like WHERE, COUNT, MIN, MAX, Top K, HAVING and GROUP BY as shown
in (Kotsogiannis et al., 2019a; Wang et al., 2017; Bater et al., 2017; Kotsogiannis et al., 2019b;
Suresh et al., 2019). The work in Groce et al. (2019) combines private set intersection with
differential privacy. A more relevant version of work for differentially private JOIN queries
was presented in (Narayan and Haeberlen, 2012; Chen and Zhou, 2013).
5. Private stream searching
These techniques work on privately matching a query with respect to a data stream. The work in
Bethencourt et al. (2009) requires a communication and storage complexity of O(mlog(t/m))
where m is upper bound on size of documents and t is the number of documents in the stream.
6. Private information storage
These techniques give protocols for both private reading as well as writing of a database
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(Clarke et al., 2001, 2002; Tajeddine et al., 2018; Ostrovsky and Shoup, 1997; Iliev and Smith,
2004; Kumar et al., 2017) and therefore are suitable for distributed storage systems.
7. Formal notions of privacy There are several formally established notions of privacy such
as (, δ)-differential privacy (Dwork, 2008; Dwork and Smith, 2010; Dwork et al., 2011,
2014; Abadi et al., 2016; Machanavajjhala et al., 2008; Nissim et al., 2012; McSherry and
Talwar, 2007; Nissim et al., 2007, 2012, 2017), Lipschitz privacy (Koufogiannis et al., 2015a,b;
Chatzikokolakis et al., 2013; Koufogiannis, 2017; Koufogiannis and Pappas, 2016), Blowfish
privacy (He et al., 2014; Nie et al., 2010; Machanavajjhala and Kifer, 2015), Pufferfish privacy
(Kifer and Machanavajjhala, 2014; Song et al., 2017; Kifer and Machanavajjhala, 2012) which
allows the user to specify a class of protected predicates that must be learned subject to the
guarantees of differential privacy, and all other predicates can be learned without differential
privacy, Minimax filter, ON-OFF privacy, Secure Shuffling, concentrated differential privacy,
local differential privacy, central differential privacy and Renyi differential privacy (Mironov,
2017; Wang et al., 2018; Geumlek et al., 2017). Each of these notions of privacy has a
formal mathematical definition of privacy. There is a lengthy body of work of several privacy-
preserving mechanisms that can help attain one or more of these stringent notions of privacy,
depending on the statistical query or statistical model being privatized in the presence of any
constraints that might be present.
8. Cryptographic computation This can be categorized into techniques for homomorphic en-
cryption (Gentry and Boneh, 2009; Naehrig et al., 2011; Van Dijk et al., 2010; Brakerski and
Vaikuntanathan, 2011; Stehle´ and Steinfeld, 2010; Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan, 2014; Brak-
erski et al., 2014; Gentry and Halevi, 2011; Fan and Vercauteren, 2012; Smart and Vercauteren,
2010; Damga˚rd et al., 2012; Fontaine and Galand, 2007; Cramer et al., 2001; Sathya et al.,
2018) and secure multi-party computation Yao (1982b,a); Ishai et al. (2007); Evans et al. (2017,
2018); Bogetoft et al. (2009); Lindell (2005); Goldreich (1998); Canetti et al. (1996); Cramer
et al. (2015); Ben-David et al. (2008); Garg et al. (2014); Hirt et al. (2000); Atallah and Du
(2001)
9. Private data release methods The work in Chanyaswad et al. (2019) gives a good survey of
works on non-interactive private data release. In the case of supervised learning, the private
data release methods are categorized into private dimensionality reduction such as in (Jiang
et al., 2013; Blocki et al., 2012) and private generative model based approaches such as
(Ullman and Vadhan, 2010; Dwork et al., 2009; Bindschaedler et al., 2017). There have been
works focusing on other specific queries outside the realm of supervised learning such as for
releasing k-way contingency tables in Hardt et al. (2012) via private data release. The work in
Gupta et al. (2012) focuses on private data release for the query of releasing graph cuts and
Balog et al. (2017) shows a method for private data release based on kernel mean embeddings.
2. Background on Splintering
We now detail the first-order idea of splintering introduced in (Vepakomma* and Raskar*, 2019;
Raskar et al., 2019) given its direct relevance to this paper.
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2.1 Splintering
For a d dimensional input query vector x, the client device creates d shares corresponding to x as
{z1, z2 . . . zd} so that
x = Splint(z1, z2 . . . zd), ∀i ∈ 1..d
The most basic splint function that allows for such a representation is a linear combination using
coefficients αi as
x =
d∑
i
αizi, ∀i ∈ 1..d
The α′is are private to the client and not shared with any other entity, be it another client or a
server. The splinters zi are shared with the server. The server performs a set of application dependent
operations on the splinters zi,∀i ∈ 1 . . . d and sends results {βi} back to client on either all or a
subset of the d shares. The client performs a local computation called UnSplint using original
shares zi, its corresponding αi’s that are known only to the client and received β′is obtained from the
server. This unsplinting operation reveals the true result l of the intended application to the client.
l = UnSplint(αi, zi, βi), ∀i ∈ 1..d
Note that although x is represented via a linear combination, the computation of {βi} and UnSplint
is not necessarily linear.
2.2 Previous examples of Splintering
2.3 k-nearest neighbors
A splintering scheme for the problem of finding the k-nearest vectors in a private database on a
server with respect to a private query vector on the client was proposed in Vepakomma* and Raskar*
(2019).
2.4 Set inclusion
Ascertaining set inclusion and set intersection is an important primitive used in databases, information
retrieval and cryptography. Raskar et al. (2019) introduced a splinter based bucketization scheme for
the problem of ascertaining set inclusion. The setting that was considered involves the client that
attempts to ascertain if its query data vector exists in a database on the server.
2.5 Newer proposals for splintering
We now propose splintering schemes for two more important operations of inner product and matrix
inverse.
2.6 Inner product
We propose a splintering scheme for private computation of an inner product in the following setting.
The client has a private data vector x, the server has a large private database of data vectors B and
the client wants to find the inner products 〈x,yk〉,∀yk ∈ B. The client does not want the server to
learn x while the server does not want the client to learn the records in its database.
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2.6.1 NON-MALICIOUS CLIENT
We first consider the setting where the client is non-malicious and genuinely would like obtain the
list of inner products with respect to the servers data while protecting the privacy of its data. In this
setting, the client for represents its data record using d splinters as
x =
d∑
i
αizi, ∀i ∈ 1..d
The αi’s are private to the client and not shared with any other entity, be it another client or a
server. The splinters zi are shared with the server. The scheme for generation of splinters is described
in sections 3,4 and 5 along with hardness of recovery guarantees for the clients privacy.
The server returns the inner products of 〈zi,yk〉∀zi ∈ {z1, z2 . . . zd} and ∀yk ∈ B. The client
obtains the inner product for any x,yk as ∑
i
αdi 〈zi,yk〉
The client uses a different set of splinters for every single query with the server.
2.6.2 MALICIOUS CLIENT
In the case where the client is malicious and intends to recover all the vectors in the private database,
the setting is equivalent to the well known problem of learning mixtures of linear regressions
(Mazumdar and Pal, 2020; Yin et al., 2018; Chen et al., 2020; Li and Liang, 2018) which is a
generalization of the compressed sensing problem when the cardinality, |B| > 1 as in any typical
database.
2.6.3 STATEMENT OF LEARNING MIXTURE OF SPARSE LINEAR REGRESSIONS PROBLEM
Given L = |B| unknown distinct vectors y1,y2, . . . ,yL ∈ Rp and each is t-sparse meaning that the
number of non-zero entries in each yi is at most t where it is a known parameter. We define an oracle
on the server which, when queried with a splinter zˆi, returns the noisy output 〈zˆi,yk〉+ η where η is
a random variable with an expectation of 0 and yk is uniformly chosen from the B. The goal is to
recover all vectors in B (i.e, data of the server) by making a set of queries zˆ1, zˆ2, ..., zˆm to the server.
2.7 Attack scheme for inner product and hardness of recovery of servers database
Therefore the malicious client can recover the servers dataset from the resulting inner products by
sending rows of a Vandermonde matrix to the server as its splinters as described in Krishnamurthy
et al. (2019). The recovery guarantees provided there are as follows. The malicious client can
estimate the servers data with O(t log3 n exp(σ/)2/3) number of vandemonde samples where  is
the precision(in terms of number of digits of servers data vector) and σ is the variance of η. If there is
no noise, then the malicious client can recover all of servers data with 2tL log(tL) and the recovery
is guaranteed with at least 1− (3/t) probability.
Condition without any sparsity requirements Therefore under no sparsity condition, we can
change k to p in that bound. Where p is the size of entries in each data record on the server.
The bounds will still hold and reveal under no additional noise condition with O(2pL log(pL))
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Vandermonde samples. So adding noise and changing precision is important to have the other bound
which is exponential instead at O(n log3 n exp(σ/)2/3) under the no sparsity case while limiting
the number of queries from the client according to this complexity, in order for the server to have a
protection from the malicious client.
2.8 Matrix Inverse
We now propose a splintering scheme for the important operation of matrix inversion in this sub-
section. We consider a setting where the client has a large sensitive matrix Mn×n and would like
to use the service of a computationally powerful server in order to privately obtain the inverse
M−1 . In order to obtain the inverse of a private matrix Mn×n, we split it into the form using
An×n,Un×k,Vk×n and Z2 of dimension k × k as
M−1 = (A + UZ2V)−1 (1)
where A is written in terms of a splinter matrix Z1 of dimension n× n as
A = α1Z1 (2)
and UZ2V is of the form α3 α3
α3

︸ ︷︷ ︸
U
Z2
α4 α4
α4

︸ ︷︷ ︸
V
(3)
where Z2 is the other splinter. Now by the pupular matrix inversion lemma (ShermanMorrisonWood-
bury formula)
(A + UZ2V)
−1 = A−1 −A−1U(Z2−1 + VA−1U)−1VA−1
Therefore the proposed scheme now is to send Z1,Z2 to the server which sends back Z−11 ,Z
−1
2 to
the client that holds M along with the secret coefficients α1, α2, α3. The client then obtains the final
solution M−1 by computing
(α1Z1 + UZ2V)
−1 = 1/α1Z1−1 − 1/α1Z1−1U(Z2−1 + V1/α1Z1−1U)−11/α1VZ1−1
2.8.1 COMPUTATIONAL SAVINGS
In cases where n >> k, the matrix (Z2−1 +VA−1U)−1 which is of dimension k×k is much easier
to invert than the original private data matrix Mn×n thereby offloading the heavier computation onto
the server while preserving privacy and requiring a much smaller computation on the client.
3. Generation of splinters
In this section, we first introduce our initial solution for generating the splinters. An improved
solution based on Gaussian mixtures is provided in section 4 and this is further improved with decoy
splinters in section 5. We back our scheme with hardness of recovery guarantees based on inability to
distinguish the distribution of one splinter from its corresponding decoy splinters based on minimum
required sample complexity that is in turn influenced by the condition number of estimation and total
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variation distance between the Gaussian mixtures. We therefore learn distributions that satisfy these
required conditions in order to be used as generative distributions to sample the corresponding decoy
splinters.
3.1 Initial solution
We now share details of the initial solution for generating splinters Zi within the above framework. In
this version, d− 1 out of d splinters used are data-independent and sampled from a different chosen
distribution each with large variance-covariances. The client first generates d− 1 data-independent
samples as Zi ∼ N (0,Σi), ∀i ∈ {1 . . . d− 1}. Only one splinter is dependent on data X and is
generated as
Zd =
1
αd
(X−
∑
i 6=d
Zi)
where αd is the corresponding secret coefficient for the data dependent splinter. The rest of the
coefficients are also secret and only known to the client and never shared with the server.
Rescaling step Once the data dependent coefficient and splinter have been generated, the rest of the
data-independent splinters are scaled by their corresponding secret coefficients as Zi = 1αiZi. All
the secret coefficients αi have are chosen from a p-bit base-2 floating point system allowed by the
computer architecture, where p ∈ {16, 32, 64}. Therefore, in order to reconstruct a data matrix X
from scaled Zi’s; one would need access to the secret coefficients. Every communication from the
client to server in this scheme involves a different set of splinters.
4. MixtureSplinters for improved splinter generation
We now improve upon the initial solution from previous section for this problem of splinter generation.
We refer to this improved version as MixtureSplinters. We further build upon this version in the next
section and proposed a more secure version of this scheme called DecoySplinters by introducing a
notion of statistical decoys.
In MixtureSplinters, each splinter is generated from a different Gaussian mixture with m compo-
nents as,
zi ∼
m∑
a=1
ωiag
i =
m∑
a=1
ωiaN
(
x;µia,Σ
i
a
)
(4)
The client data record x is represented using these splinters, just like in the previous sections as
x =
d∑
i
αizi, ∀i ∈ 1..d
4.1 Hardness of recovery guarantees for client data
Estimation of Gaussian mixtures has been extensively studied in (Kalai et al., 2012; Kannan et al.,
2005; Moitra and Valiant, 2010; Dasgupta, 1999; Ge et al., 2015; Sanjeev and Kannan, 2001;
Daskalakis and Kamath, 2014). Sample complexity for an -approximation of a p-dimensional
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Gaussian mixture with m components is
n >
(
κ(zi).p
δ
)cm
samples with probability greater than 1− δ where
κ(zi) =
1
min({w1, w2, . . . , wk} ∪ {Dtv(Fi, Fj)|i 6= j})
is the condition number of the estimation of the Gaussian mixture.
Therefore, when each zi is sampled with a different Gaussian mixture with many components
m such that wi is a very small probability or if the total variation distance between individual
multivariate Gaussian components, Fi, Fj is small, it would lead to a very high sample complexity
required for any reasonably accurate estimation of the splinter distributions.
5. Generating decoy distributions
We now propose a novel approach of DecoySplinter for further increasing the security of the
MixtureSplinter scheme. The idea of a decoy splinter is to generate random splinters that are not
supposed to be used in order to obtain a proper reconstruction of the dataset. That is any random
splinter that is sent to the server in addition to the d-splinters that form the relation
x =
d∑
i
αizi,∀i ∈ 1, 2, . . . , d
is a decoy splinter. A malicious server would need to set the coeeficients of these splinters to 0, in
addition to guessing the right secret coefficients of the non-decoy splinters.
5.1 Bruteforce attack success probability
The bruteforce attack probability of success for guessing the right combination of secret coefficients
when there are d non-decoy splinters, q − d decoy splinters, and each coefficient is a b-bit number is
based on a power tower function in the denominator as
1
2bd × ( qq−d)
and therefore is infintesimally small.
5.2 Key insight to motivate the notion of a statistical decoy:
For a decoy splinter to be effective, it needs to be such that it is very hard to statistically distinguish
between a decoy splinter and a non-decoy splinter. Given the known probability distribution of
zi ∼ G for a Gaussian mixture, if a decoy Gaussian mixture destribution to sample decoys from as
di ∼ H is generated, such that the total variation distance Dtv(G,H) ≤ τ , then it would require an
order of atleast 1/τ samples to have a constant probability of distinguishing between the case that all
samples arise from G or all samples arise fromH. The decoy splinter distributions corresponding to
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every non-decoy splinter distribution gi can be therefore generated such that Dtv(G,H) ≤ τ . Note
that the covariance and mean of the corresponding Gaussian mixture of each splinter distribution is,
ΣiG =
∑
a
Σiaw
i
a +
∑
a
(µia)
Tµiaw
i
a − (µia)Tµia
and
µiG =
∑
a
µia
By the Pinsker’s inequality we have
DTV (G,H) ≤
√
2DKL(G,H)
We therefore now show a way to learn a Gaussian mixture from which a decoy shadow can be
sampled. We do this by ensuring that the learnt Gaussian mixture of the decoy has a KL-divergence
less than τ with respect to the high-condition number Gaussian mixture from which the corresponding
real shadow was sampled. In addition to these splinters which are tagged correspondingly to non-
decoy splinters, we also generate a data independent untagged decoy splinter using the same mixture
distribution used to generate the non-decoy splinter. The decoys, untagged decoys and real splinters
are all shuffled to not be in an order before sharing with a server.
5.3 Optimizing Average of Bounds on KL-Divergence between two GMMs through distance
covariance
For the distribution learning problem motivated in the previous section, the key is to be able to learn
a τ -close Gaussian mixture to a given target Gaussian mixture. We therefore share some results on
KL-divergences between Gaussian mixtures Durrieu et al. (2012). Let f and g be two PDFs in Rd,
where d is the dimension of the observed vectors x. The KL-divergence between f and g is defined
as:
DKL(f ||g) =
∫
Rd
f(x) log
f(x)
g(x)
dx (5)
When f and g are PDFS of multivariate normals:
DKL(f ||g) =1
2
log
|Σg|
|Σf | +
1
2
Tr((Σg)−1Σf ) +
1
2
(µf − µg)T (Σg)−1(µf − µg)− d
2
(6)
When f and g are PDFs for GMMs, the expression for f becomes (with an analogous expression for
g):
f(x) =
A∑
a=1
ωfafa(x) =
A∑
a=1
ωfaN
(
x;µfa ,Σ
f
a
)
(7)
Durrieu and Thiran define the bounds for KL-Divergence between GMMs to be:
Dlower(f ||g) =
∑
a
ωfa log
∑
α ω
f
αe−DKL(fa||fα)∑
b ω
g
b tab
−
∑
a
ωfaH(fa) (8)
Dupper(f ||g) =
∑
a
ωfa log
∑
α ω
f
αzaα∑
b ω
g
b e
−DKL(fa||gb) +
∑
a
ωfaH(fa) (9)
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where H(fa) is the entropy of fa, and the normalization constants of the product of the individual
Gaussians are given by:
log tab = −d
2
log 2pi − 1
2
log |Σfa + Σgb | −
1
2
(µgb − µfa)T (Σfa + Σgb)−1(µgb − µfa) (10)
log zaα = −d
2
log 2pi − 1
2
log |Σfa + Σfα| −
1
2
(µfα − µfa)T (Σfa + Σfα)−1(µfα − µfa) (11)
We will focus on optimizing the following average of the lower and upper bounds of the KL-
Divergence between GMMs as it was shown to be a good estimate of the KL-Divergence between
GMMs in Durrieu et al. (2012).
Davg(f ||g) = 1
2
(
Dlower(f ||g) +Dupper(f ||g)
)
=
1
2
(∑
a
ωfa log
∑
α ω
f
αe−DKL(fa||fα)∑
b ω
g
b tab
−
∑
a
ωfaH(fa)
)
+
1
2
(∑
a
ωfa log
∑
α ω
f
αzaα∑
b ω
g
b e
−DKL(fa||gb) +
∑
a
ωfaH(fa)
)
=
1
2
∑
a
ωfa log
∑
α ω
f
αe−DKL(fa||fα)∑
b ω
g
b tab
+
1
2
∑
a
ωfa log
∑
α ω
f
αzaα∑
b ω
g
b e
−DKL(fa||gb)
Davg(f ||g) = 1
2
∑
a
ωfa
[
log
∑
α
ωfαe
−DKL(fa||fα) + log
∑
α
ωfαzaα − log
∑
b
ωgb tab − log
∑
b
ωgb e
−DKL(fa||gb)
]
If we assume that the data is mean-centered, the normalization constant tab becomes:
log tab = −d
2
log 2pi − 1
2
log |Σfa + Σgb |
tab = e
(
− d
2
log 2pi− 1
2
log |Σfa+Σgb |
)
tab = (2pi)
− d
2 |Σfa + Σgb |−
1
2 (12)
Similarly, zaα = (2pi)
− d
2 |Σfa + Σfα|− 12 .
Plugging this into (8), we get:
Davg(f ||g) = 1
2
∑
a
ωfa

log
∑
α
ωfαe
−DKL(fa||fα) + log
∑
α
ωfα (2pi)
− d2 |Σfa + Σfα|−
1
2
− log
∑
b
ωgb (2pi)
− d2 |Σfa + Σgb |−
1
2 − log
∑
b
ωgb e
−DKL(fa||gb)

=
1
2
∑
a
ωfa

log
∑
α
ωfαe
−DKL(fa||fα) +
d log 2pi
2
+ log
∑
α
ωfα√
|Σfa + Σfα|
− d log 2pi
2
− log
∑
b
ωgb√
|Σfa + Σgb |
− log
∑
b
ωgb e
−DKL(fa||gb)

Davg(f ||g) = 1
2
∑
a
ωfa
log∑
α
ωfαe
−DKL(fa||fα) + log
∑
α
ωfα√
|Σfa + Σfα|
− log
∑
b
ωgb e
−DKL(fa||gb) − log
∑
b
ωgb√
|Σfa + Σgb |

(13)
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6. Distance correlation-KL divergence separability
In the form of the equation above, KL-divergence between Gaussian mixtures is separable into
terms that only depend on the KL-divergence between the multivariate Gaussian components that
form the mixture. We can substitute −DKL(fa||fα) with distance correlation DCor(Σfa ,Σfα) and
−DKL(fa||gb) with DCor(Σfa ,Σgb) instead based on our Theorem 1 below which shows that optimiz-
ing KL-divergence between multivariate Gaussians is equivalent to optimizing distance correlation
for the same.
Theorem 1 Minimization of distance correlation argmin
Z
dCor(X,Z) with respect to Z maximizes
the Kullback-Leibler divergence, KL(X||Z) for X ∼ N (0,ΣX) and Z ∼ N (0,ΣZ)
Proof Distance correlation can be represented as Tr (X
TXZTZ)√
Tr (XTX)2 Tr (ZTZ)2
Vepakomma et al. (2018).
For covariance matrices ΣX = XTX and ΣZ = ZTZ we have
det[(XTX)2] det([ZTZ])2 ≤ Tr (XTXZTZ) (14)
≤
√
Tr (XTX)2 Tr (ZTZ)2
by arithmetic-geometric mean inequality for the lower bound and Cauchy-Schwartz inequality for
the upper bound on distance covariance Tr (XTXZTZ). log det(ZTZ) is the differential entropy
h(Z) upto a constant for multivariate Gaussians. Similarly, the joint entropy h(X,Z) is given
by log det(Σ) where Σ =
[
XTX XTZ
ZTX ZTZ
]
Kullback-Leibler divergence is defined using joint
entropy and entropy as h(X||Z) = h(X,Z)− h(X). By Fischer’s inequality, we have
det(Σ) ≤ det(XTX) det(ZTZ)
As det(XTX) is fixed and det(ZTZ) decreases with decrease in distance covariance, an increase of
h(X||Z) is only possible when h(X,Z) = log det(Σ) increases which is inturn only possible when
Tr(XTZ) decreases. Thereby minimizing sum of distance covariance and Tr(XTZ) maximizes the
Kullback-Leibler divergence in the direction stated above while it also minimizes differential entropy
det(ZTZ).
Therefore we have the following objective that needs to be optimized instead.
1
2
∑
a
ωfa
log∑
α
ωfαe
DCov(Σfa ,Σ
f
α) + log
∑
α
ωfα√
|Σfa + Σfα|
− log
∑
b
ωgb e
DCov(Σfa ,Σ
g
b ) − log
∑
b
ωgb√
|Σfa + Σgb |

Note that two terms are constant in here with respect to the target mixture distribution as follows
Davg(f ||g) = 1
2
∑
a
ωfa
C1 + C2 − log∑
b
ωgb√
|Σfa + Σgb |
− log
∑
b
ωgb e
DCov(Σaf ,Σ
g
b )
 (15)
12
(a) Classifier reaches chance accuracy upon at-
tempting to classify multiple real splinter sam-
ples from decoy splinters on the EEG eye state
dataset for increasing number of decoy samples
shown in the legend. The real splinter samples
and decoy splinter samples were generated from
the mixture distributions learnt by our scheme.
In practice, there is only one sample per real dis-
tribution and multiple decoy samples, thereby
making these results a lot more conservative.
(b) Classifier reaches chance accuracy upon at-
tempting to classify multiple real splinter sam-
ples from decoy splinters on the Avila dataset
for increasing number of decoy samples shown
in the legend. The rest of setup is as described
in figure a.)
(c) Classifier reaches chance accuracy upon at-
tempting to classify multiple real splinter sam-
ples from decoy splinters on the skin segmen-
tation dataset for increasing number of decoy
samples shown in the legend. The rest of setup
is as described in figure a.) and the dataset
dimensions are presented in Table 1.
(d) We show decreasing values of KL-
divergence between the real and decoy splin-
ters with respect to the iterations of our scheme.
The splinters were generated while ensuring
they are decorrelated with side-information of
labels, so that they do not leak that information
when sent to the server as part of splintering.
A cross-section of this effect of decorrelating
with labels while ensuring real and decoy splin-
ters are not distinguished is presented in Fig.3
below
Figure 1: In subfigures a.), b.) and c.), we show that state of the art tuned classification models
such as XGBoost cannot distinguish between the real and decoy splinters generated by our scheme,
thereby making it really hard for the attacker to estimate the pair of mixture distributions used to
sample the real and decoy splinters. We also show convergence of reducing KL-divergence between
the learnt Gaussian mixture and the target Gaussian mixture.
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6.1 Required conditions for convexity
We now share some required conditions for the convexity of the key terms above. The function
log
∑
b
ωgb√
|Σfa+Σgb |
is convex if
ωgb
∑
b
 ωgb√
|Σfa + Σgb |
− ωgb
 ≥ 0
as this results in a positive semi-definite Hessian. This condition simplifies to requiring√
|Σfa + Σgb | ≤ ωgb ,∀b
By the arithmetic-geometric-mean (A.G.M) inequality we have,
n∏
k=1
λk ≤ 1
nn
(
n∑
k=1
λk
)n
Therefore
∑
b |Σfa + Σgb | ≤
∑
b[Tr(Σ
f
a+Σ
g
b )]
n
nn This implies that if,∑
b
Tr(Σfa + Σ
g
b) ≤ n n
√
ωgb , ∀b
then the condition for convexity
∑
b
√
|Σfa + Σgb | ≤ n n
√
ωgb , ∀b will be satisfied.
6.2 Convexity of LogSumExp(DCOV)
The function LogSumExp(p) = log(
∑
i(e
p
i )) is convex. We now show that the LogSumExp
function log
∑
b ω
g
b e
DCov(Σaf ,Σ
g
b ) is convex as well. In fact, LogSumExp(f(z)) happens to be
convex for any convex function f(z) as shown below.
∂2
∂z2
log
∑
efi(z) =
∂
∂z
[∑
(efi (z)
∂
∂zfi(z))∑
efi(z)
]
(16)
which is equal to ∑
efi
∂2
∂z2
fi(z)∑
efi(z)
+
∑
ef
i(z)[ ∂∂zfi(z)]
2∑
efi(z)
− (
∑
efi(z) ∂∂zfi(z))
2
(
∑
efi(z))2
(17)
The first term is positive. The difference of the next two terms is positive due to Jensen’s
inequality as ∑[
ai
(
∂
∂z
fi(z)
)2]
≥
[∑
ai
∂
∂z
fi(z)
]2
(18)
This proves convexity of log
∑
b ω
g
b e
DCov(Σaf ,Σ
g
b ).
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Dataset Sample Size Attributes Balanced # of Classes
EEG Eye State 14,980 15 Yes 2
Avila 20,867 10 Yes 12
Skin Segmentation 245,057 4 No 2
Table 1: A listing of datasets that we used for empirical investigations is provided in this table along
with their dimensions.
Figure 2: We show that the raw data of face image can only be reconstructed after using the right
secret coefficients upto a high precision. We show in this qualitative example that the quality of
reconstruction is lost if the precision is below 4 floating point decimal places as seen in the 2
reconstructed images on the top row.
Figure 3: The splinters were generated while ensuring they are decorrelated with side-information
of labels, so that they do not leak that information when sent to the server as part of splintering. A
cross-section of this effect of decorrelating with labels while ensuring real and decoy splinters are
not distinguished. As seen the class labels of the raw data X are originally separable while they are
overlapping in the splinters. The splinters are always generated in a multivariate setting. This is a
qualitative cross-sectional result on a single variable, for visualization purposes although the run was
done on multivariate data.
6.3 Modified EM algorithm for our structured distribution learning problem
To maximize the average bound on KL-divergence Davg(f ||g), the following has to be minimized
1
2
∑
a
ωfa
log∑
α
ωfαe
DCov(Σfa ,Σ
f
α) + log
∑
α
ωfα√
|Σfa + Σfα|
− log
∑
b
ωgb e
DCov(Σfa ,Σ
g
b ) − log
∑
b
ωgb√
|Σfa + Σgb |

(19)
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With Σfg = 1N−1Z
T
b Zb, where N is the number of samples, our problem is equivalent to minimizing
the following for each component a
ωfa log
∑
α
ωfαe
DCov(Σfa ,Σ
f
α) + ωfa log
∑
α
ωfα√
|Σfa + Σfα|
(20)
− ωfa log
∑
b
ωgb e
DCov(Σfa , 1N−1Z
T
b Zb) − ωfa log
∑
b
ωgb√
|Σfa + 1N−1ZTb Zb|
(21)
= ωfa (C1 + C2)− ωfa log
∑
b
ωgb e
DCov(Σfa , 1N−1Z
T
b Zb) − ωfa log
∑
b
ωgb√
|Σfa + 1N−1ZTb Zb|
(22)
− ωfa log
∑
b
ωgb e
DCov
(
Σfa ,
1
N−1(Zb−µ
g
b)
T
(Zb−µgb)
)
− ωfa log
∑
b
ωgb e
− 1
2
(
µgb−µfa
)T(
Σfa+
1
N−1(Zb−µ
g
b)
T
(Zb−µgb)
)−1(
µgb−µfa
)
√
|Σfa + 1N−1(Zb − µgb)T (Zb − µgb)|
(23)
+ ωfa (C1 + C2) + λ.EMLoss
where the EMLoss in the last term is the standard EM loss. Here, the objective function is regularized
with the standard loss used in EM-algorithms for estimating Gaussian mixtures. Therefore we now
have a modified EM algorithm that learns Gaussian mixtures with respect to a target distribution
while satisfying the closeness constraints with respect to KL-divergence.
E-step updates: For each component b at step t, compute
γ
(t+1)
ib =
ωgb
(t)
p
(
yi|µgb (t),Σgb (t)
)
∑B
b′=1w
g
b′
(t)
p
(
yi|µgb′ (t),Σgb′ (t)
) , i = 1, . . . , N
and finally
n
(t+1)
b =
N∑
i=1
γ
(t+1)
ib
M-step updates: For each component b, compute the following update
ωgb
(t+1)
=
n
(t+1)
b
N
Using Powell minimization method we obtain the update for the mean vectors as follows
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µgb
(t+1)
=
min
µ

− ωfb log
∑
b′ 6=b
ωgb′
(t)
e
DCov
(
Σf
b′ ,
1
N−1
(
Z
(t)
b′ −µ
g
b′
(t)
)T(
Z
(t)
b′ −µ
g
b′
(t)
))
+ ωgb
(t)
e
DCov
(
Σfb ,
1
N−1
(
Z
(t)
b −µ
)T(
Z
(t)
b −µ
))
− ωfb log

∑
b′ 6=b
ωgb′
(t)
e
− 1
2
(
µg
b′−µ
f
b′
)T(
Σf
b′+
1
N−1
(
Z
(t)
b′ −µ
g
b′
(t)
)T(
Z
(t)
b′ −µ
g
b′
(t)
))−1(
µg
b′−µ
f
b′
)
√∣∣∣∣Σfb′ + 1N−1 (Z(t)b′ − µgb′ (t))T (Z(t)b′ − µgb′ (t))∣∣∣∣
+
ωgb
(t)
e
− 1
2
(
µ−µfb
)T(
Σfb+
1
N−1
(
Z
(t)
b −µ
)T(
Z
(t)
b −µ
))−1(
µ−µfb
)
√∣∣∣∣Σfb + 1N−1 (Z(t)b − µ)T (Z(t)b − µ)∣∣∣∣

+ ωfb (C1 + C2)
+
1
2
∑
b′ 6=b

n
(t+1)
b′ log
∣∣∣∣∣
(
1
N − 1
(
Z
(t)
b′ − µgb′ (t)
)T (
Z
(t)
b′ − µgb′ (t)
))−1∣∣∣∣∣
+
N∑
i=1
γ
(t+1)
ib′ Tr


(
Z
(t)
b′ − µgb′ (t)
)T (
Z
(t)
b′ − µgb′ (t)
)
N − 1

−1 (
xi − µgb′ (t)
)(
xi − µgb′ (t)
)T

+
1
2

n
(t+1)
b log
∣∣∣∣∣
(
1
N − 1
(
Z
(t)
b − µ
)T (
Z
(t)
b − µ
))−1∣∣∣∣∣
+
N∑
i=1
γ
(t+1)
ib Tr


(
Z
(t)
b − µ
)T (
Z
(t)
b − µ
)
N − 1

−1
(xi − µ) (xi − µ)T



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Using Powell minimization method for Zb we optimize
Z
(t+1)
b =
min
Z

− ωfb log
∑
b′ 6=b
ωgb′
(t)
e
DCov
(
Σf
b′ ,
1
N−1
(
Z
(t)
b′ −µ
g
b′
(t)
)T(
Z
(t)
b′ −µ
g
b′
(t)
))
+ ωgb
(t)
e
DCov
(
Σfb ,
1
N−1
(
Z−µgb (t)
)T(
Z−µgb (t)
))
− ωfb log

∑
b′ 6=b
ωgb′
(t)
e
− 1
2
(
µg
b′−µ
f
b′
)T(
Σf
b′+
1
N−1
(
Z
(t)
b′ −µ
g
b′
(t)
)T(
Z
(t)
b′ −µ
g
b′
(t)
))−1(
µg
b′−µ
f
b′
)
√∣∣∣∣Σfb′ + 1N−1 (Z(t)b′ − µgb′ (t))T (Z(t)b′ − µgb′ (t))∣∣∣∣
+
ωgb
(t)
e
− 1
2
(
µgb
(t)−µfb
)T(
Σfb+
1
N−1
(
Z−µgb (t)
)T(
Z−µgb (t)
))−1(
µgb
(t)−µfb
)
√∣∣∣∣Σfb + 1N−1 (Z − µgb (t))T (Z − µgb (t))∣∣∣∣

+ ωfb (C1 + C2)
+
1
2
∑
b′ 6=b

n
(t+1)
b′ log
∣∣∣∣∣
(
1
N − 1
(
Z
(t)
b′ − µgb′ (t)
)T (
Z
(t)
b′ − µgb′ (t)
))−1∣∣∣∣∣
+
N∑
i=1
γ
(t+1)
ib′ Tr


(
Z
(t)
b′ − µgb′ (t)
)T (
Z
(t)
b′ − µgb′ (t)
)
N − 1

−1 (
xi − µgb′ (t)
)(
xi − µgb′ (t)
)T

+
1
2

n
(t+1)
b log
∣∣∣∣∣
(
1
N − 1
(
Z − µgb (t)
)T (
Z − µgb (t)
))−1∣∣∣∣∣
+
N∑
i=1
γ
(t+1)
ib Tr


(
Z − µgb (t)
)T (
Z − µgb (t)
)
N − 1

−1 (
xi − µgb (t)
)(
xi − µgb (t)
)T


7. Experiments
In this section, we share quantitative and qualitative empirical findings upon applying our proposed
approach to various datasets described in Table 1.
In subfigures 1a.), 1b.) and 1c.), we show that state of the art tuned classification modelssuch as
XGBoost cannot distinguish between the real and decoy splinters generated by our scheme,thereby
making it really hard for the attacker to estimate the pair of mixture distributions used tosample the
real and decoy splinters. We also show convergence of reducing KL-divergence between the learnt
Gaussian mixture and the target Gaussian mixture in Figure 1d.)
We also visualize example splinters including the decoy and real non-decoy splinters along
with their reconstructions in Figure 2 upon choosing the right secret coefficients albeit at varying
number of floating point precisions. We see that in this particular example the real image cannot be
reconstructed back unless the coefficients were correctly chosen upto 4 decimal point places. The
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2 by 2 images of face reconstructions are for exactly chosen secret coefficients upto 2,3, 4 and 5
decimal places.
In Figure 3. we show that the splinters were generated while ensuring they are decorrelated with
side-information of labels, so that they do not leak that information when sent to the server as part of
splintering. A cross-section of this effect of decorrelating with labels while ensuring real and decoy
splinters are not distinguished. As seen the class labels of the raw data X are originally separable
while they are overlapping in the splinters. The splinters are always generated in a multivariate setting.
This is aqualitative cross-sectional result on a single variable, for visualization purposes although
the run wasdone on multivariate data. We use default SciPy parameters for powell minimization
to optimize mu and parameters of ftol = 0.001, xtol = 0.001, maxfev = 4000 for
optimizing Zb.
8. Conclusion
We provide a new scheme for secure computation called splintering that is well suited for distributed
machine learning given its efficiency with respect to the resources of compute and bandwidth. We
share various theoretical guarantees and practical insights of our approach. We would also like to
extend this scheme to other useful private operations and thereby build a toolbox for splintering based
computational pipelines. We find our approach to be particularly suitable for privatizing training and
inference on split learning a popular distributed machine learning technique.
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Using the property ∇X detk(X + tY ) = k detk(X + tY )(X + tY )−T (from page 449 of Convex
Optimization & Euclidean Distance Geometry) with k = t = 1, the first and second derivatives of∣∣∣Σfa + Σgb ∣∣∣ are given by
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